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Abstract
This study traces the evolution of commons-based peer production by a measurement-
based analysis of case studies and disusses the impact of peer production on net
neutrality and copyright law. The measurements include websites such as Suprnova.
org, Youtube.com, and Facebook.com, and the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems Kazaa,
Bittorrent, and Tribler. The measurements show the two sides of peer production,
the pirate side with free availability of Hollywood movies on these P2P systems
and the samaritan side exhibited by the quick joining of 400,000+ people in a com-
munity to organize protests against events in Burma. The telecommunications and
content industry are disrupted by this way of peer production. As a consequence,
revenues of both industries are likely to suﬀer in the coming years. On the other
hand, innovative P2P systems could win the battle on merit over classical distri-
bution technologies. As a result, a continuation is expected of both legal actions
against P2P and possible blocking actions of P2P traﬃc, violating net neutrality. It
is argued that this hinders innovation and causes a large discrepancy between legal
and user perspectives. A reform of copyright laws are clearly needed, otherwise they
will be unenforceable around 2010.
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1 Introduction
Now that one billion people are interconnected through the Internet, their
combined creative force outweighs that of any company. In the Internet, the
Email address: j.a.pouwelse@tudelft.nl (J.A. Pouwelse, P. Garbacki, D.H.J.
Epema, H.J. Sips).
Delft University of Technology technical reportroles of producers and consumers are beginning to blur and merge, a develop-
ment that is best described by the term prosumer (producer-consumer) (Toﬄer
1980). The rise of the prosumer is changing the business landscape. Yochai
Benkler has described this phenomenon as “the third mode of production”,
thereby separating it from the property-based and contract-based models of
ﬁrms and markets (Benkler 2002). Benkler uses the term commons-based peer
production to denote the creation of output by prosumers. Generally, in liter-
ature all concepts and examples of peer production focus on what is deﬁned
here as the samaritan side of peer production. However, there is also a dark
and disruptive side of peer production, i.e. the pirate side (Section 2).
In this article, measurements are presented of enabling Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
platforms, that allow large groups of prosumers to engage in peer production.
A key concept of this technology is its decentralized nature, resulting in a lack
of any single person, any authority, or any central computer server that is in
charge of the system, hence the term P2P. The measurements characterize
the development of P2P platforms over the last decade (Section 3) and cover
a diverse range of topics such as TV channel switching behavior, P2P ﬁle
sharing, friendship within Internet communities, and reputation systems.
The measurements show that peer production is growing in four directions: i)
more people are using products created using peer production, ii) the creative
output of peer production is increasing, iii) the sophistication of P2P platforms
is improving swiftly, and iv) the output types are expanding (e.g., P2P money
lending (Manjoo 2006)).
This study addresses two aspects of peer production. The ﬁrst aspect is to un-
derstand and quantify the mechanisms underlying peer production, identify
strengths, weaknesses, and conditions that enable it to ﬂourish. The second
aspect deals with the inﬂuence of peer production on convergence, net neu-
trality, copyright law, and society at large.
2 The disruptive power of commons-based peer production
Peer production can have a big impact on existing business models. The un-
leashing of the collective power of large groups of users engaging in peer pro-
duction is a disruptive change for the content, the telecommunications, and
other industries involved. The oﬀerings of a company can in some instances
even be provided at no cost by a group of organized volunteers. In this section,
evidence is given of the disruptive power of peer production.
The ﬁrst of example is the website Wikipedia.org, where users collaborate
to create an encyclopedia that can be used and downloaded for free. The
2Fig. 1. Over a decade of Internet backbone traﬃc, source: Cachelogic.com.
quality of this encyclopedia has been assessed as being roughly equal to that
of the Encyclopedia Britannica Online (Giles 2005). Signiﬁcant media coverage
followed the publication of this assessment, and it met with serious criticisms;
for example, it was called “wrong and misleading”. 1 Wikipedia is one of the
top-10 most visited websites in the world, while Britannica.com is located in
the lower parts of the top-5000, according to monitoring company Alexa.com.
This illustrates the disruptive eﬀects of peer production.
The second example shows the disruption caused by P2P technology, which
can be seen as a natural companion of peer production. P2P replaces the tradi-
tional model of an Internet user as a consumer of central server resources with
the prosumer model of a user that contributes both content and hardware
resources, thereby eliminating the need for central servers. In this respect,
P2P ﬁle sharing can be viewed as peer production where prosumers pool con-
tent (Pouwelse et al. 2005).
Internet measurements conﬁrm that P2P ﬁle sharing is the killer application
when bandwidth consumption is considered. CacheLogic (cachelogic.com)
investigated the types of traﬃc on the Internet backbone during the period
1993–2006, of which the results are shown in Figure 1. In the early 1990s, the
dominant Internet protocol was FTP. In mid 1990s, FTP traﬃc was overtaken
1 http://www.nature.com/nature/britannica/eb_advert_response_final.
pdf
3by web browsing. The emerging P2P technology almost doubled its share in
the Internet backbone each year, becoming traﬃc wise the most popular pro-
tocol after only four years of its existence. In 2006, P2P traﬃc was responsible
for over two thirds of all Internet traﬃc, surpassing web browsing by a fac-
tor of almost 3. Over 71% of all this P2P traﬃc consists of video, as show
by a measurement in Germany by ipoque.com. According to a Nielsen UK
study (Nielsen 2006), “over two-thirds of Britons online have watched some
form of video content via the Internet”. Both streaming video and download-
ing where found to be popular. Yet another measurement by Ellacoya.com
found that web traﬃc consisted of 36% HTTP streaming video. From these
various measurements, it can be concluded that numerous Internet users watch
video online, it dominates Internet traﬃc, and is transported by either HTTP
and P2P protocols.
Why do people use online video instead of existing TV broadcast infrastruc-
ture? Internet video is often free of charge, is not tied to broadcast schedules
(on-demand), is frequently removed of interruptive advertisements, and in the
case of P2P may not yet (or not anymore) be available in theaters.
To quantize the disruptive power of peer production, the availability of top
Hollywood movies is presented on the leading P2P portal of 2004, the website
suprnova.org. On the website users could ﬁnd a wealth of content and trigger
a P2P download with a single click. The system reached a popularity of around
800,000 unique visitors per day. By using website crawling techniques, detailed
records have been obtained of all ﬁles published through Suprnova (Pouwelse
et al. 2005). The measurements capture the entire lifetime of Suprnova, from
its creation in early 2003 until its (forced) shutdown near the end of 2004.
The collected dataset contains the ﬁlenames that have been with the names
of the top-1000 Hollywood movies of those years. This matching is non-trivial
as ﬁlenames are only in rare cases literal copies of the oﬃcial movie titles. For
this matching task special software has been developed that employs various
naming uniﬁcation rules (e.g., ’part II’ equals ’2’), a scoring function to ﬁnd
the most suitable match from various alternatives, and string matching based
on the Damerau-Levenshtein distance. 2
Figure 2 shows the availability of top Hollywood movies on the Suprnova
portal. The results span the time period from 2003 until end of 2004. The
horizontal axis presents the oﬃcial movie release date in US cinemas. The
vertical axis shows the date at which the ﬁle matching the movie title was
injected into Suprnova. The ﬁgure provides insight into both the number of
Hollywood titles that were available for download and the time of availability.
The correlation of the movie release time and P2P injection time is visible as
a fuzzy line pattern from the lower left corner towards the upper right corner.
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damerau-Levenshtein_distance
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Fig. 2. Comparing the Cinema release and P2P availability of top Hollywood movies.
Prior work examined a sample of 183 movies and found that 77% of them
were leaked by industry insiders (Byers et al. 2004). The measurements make
clear that for a signiﬁcant number of titles, users no longer needed to wait for
either the screening on TV or even the release in theaters, as P2P availability
precedes them. It is estimated that the cost of operating Suprnova was less
than $500 per month. From these ﬁgures it can be concluded that prosumers
collaborating to distribute video content is proving to be eﬀective, popular,
cost-eﬃcient, and disruptive to existing business models.
3 The evolution of P2P platforms
In this section, a measurement-based analysis of the evolution of P2P plat-
forms is presented. A P2P platform is deﬁned as “an enabling mechanism for
human interaction and cooperation at an unbounded scale that lacks central
points of authority and is helped by mutual donations of computer resources”.
The analysis takes the form of a sequence of seven case studies of P2P plat-
forms that each represent a step in the evolution of these platforms. A careful
study of this evolution leads us to believe that eﬀective P2P platforms have
the following four cardinal features:
(1) The ability to distinguish good from bad contributions;
(2) A regulation mechanism for computer resources;
(3) Good mechanisms for group communication;
5(4) A sense of community.
As to the ﬁrst of these features, a single contribution is considered the elemen-
tal building block of collaboration made by a single prosumer. A contribution
can have the form of, for instance, a comment of a few lines, a quality rating, or
a complete video clip. However, some contributions contain errors or are sim-
ply spam. The second feature is to ensure that suﬃcient computer resources
are available to run the P2P software and store the contributed data. The
third feature relates to creating the communication channels for prosumers to
craft their contributions. The fourth feature is the requirement of a shared
vision and culture to ensure long-term viability. A sense of community is vital
to overcome diﬀerences of opinion. Communities also provide a sense of be-
longing and incentives to motivate volunteers. This fourth cardinal feature has
been studied in the related context of collective action problems and group
formation (Cornes and Sandler 1996).
3.1 Early user-generated content and moderation
P2P platforms have a history of about ten years, starting with the creation
of the website Slashdot.org in 1997. This website is the ﬁrst large-scale case
of user-generated content and user-controlled moderation. Slashdot has been
for many years now a very popular source of technology-oriented news. It
not only just presents news, but above all it has pioneered in building a self-
regulating community of prosumers around the news by means of a discussion
area. The novelty here was that this discussion area is moderated by the users
themselves.
Slashdot users have the ability to freely attach news comments to news items.
Such comments contain remarks, enhancements, and insights on the corre-
sponding news items. Slashdot uses a rating system based on voting and
reputation to determine a score for each news comment. This score ranges
from −1 (inferior) to 5 (insightful). Users are randomly given the ability to
moderate comments by decreasing (−1) or increasing (+1) scores. The initial
comment score is 1 for registered users and 0 for anonymous comments.
In May 2000, we have measured Slashdot moderator responsiveness for 30
news items which received 4,250 news comments subjected to 1,400 moder-
ations. Figure 3 shows the average length of the moderation process, from
insertion until receiving the ﬁnal score. The initial score of almost 80% of
the comments never changed. For the others, it took on average a mere 37
minutes before insightful comments got their ﬁrst score increase. The results
show that this collaborative moderation process is swift and very responsive.
Within hours the good and the bad content is separated, as indicated by the
6Fig. 3. The responsiveness of the Slashdot rating system.
quick identiﬁcations of anonymous (start value=0) spam comments (−1). Note
that Slashdot as the ﬁrst stage in the evolution of P2P platforms lacks two
of the four cardinal features: Slashdot users cannot form groups or communi-
cate, collaborative tasks are still basic, and the resources needed to operate
the system are provided by revenues from advertisements.
3.2 Public ownership of user-generated content
Slashdot comments are generated by the users, but owned by the site owners.
The second point in the evolution of P2P platforms represents a move towards
community ownership of content. Content is placed in the public domain with
a copyright license similar to the Open Source software license. The most
sophisticated example by 1999 is the Musicbrainz.org website.
The Musicbrainz website is the home of a community that builds a music en-
cyclopedia. Musicbrainz collects information about artists, their works, coun-
try of origin, relationships between the artists, song and album release dates,
etc. Musicbrainz as of May 2008 contains the names of 380,000 artists and
6,710,000 music track releases. Most importantly, over 389,000 volunteers have
inserted content into this database and corrected (spelling) errors using an ad-
vanced voting and moderation system.
When compared to Slashdot it is clear that the way the content moderation
process works in Musicbrainz has more complexity and sophistication. The
7Table 1
Diﬀerent amount of donated computer resources in Kazaa (number of users=556).
Percentage of users Kazaa labels Sharing ratio R
38.7% None, Microscopic, Very Tiny R < 0.04
24.6% Minimal, Low 0.04 ≤ R < 0.5
14.2% Medium, High 0.5 ≤ R < 2
22.5% Guru, Deity, God 2 ≤ R
Musicbrainz system exhibits basic forms of all four cardinal features of a P2P
platform: a voting process, a fund for collection of voluntary donations for
website hosting, a mailing list dedicated to building consensus, and a shared
vision as outlined in their “social contract” (Musicbrainz 1999).
3.3 Exploiting donated computer resources
The Kazaa P2P ﬁle sharing system launched in March 2001 can be considered
the third point in the evolution of P2P platforms (Leibowitz, Ripeanu, and
Wierzbicki 2003). Kazaa enables the exchange of multimedia ﬁles between
prosumers without any server.
Early 2003 we have conducted a series of measurements investigating the regu-
lation of bandwidth in the Kazaa network. As a general networking rule, every
downloaded ﬁle must be uploaded by another user. A sharing ratio value equal
to 1.0 is achieved by users who donate the same amount of bandwidth as they
consume. Most users consume signiﬁcantly more bandwidth than they con-
tribute. This problem is known as “freeriding” (Adar and Huberman 2000).
Table 1 shows the sharing ratios for a sample of 556 Kazaa users (ratio of
uploaded versus downloaded bytes). A small minority of prosumers (22.5%)
in Figure 1 labeled in the Kazaa user interface as ‘Deity’ and ‘God’ are re-
sponsible for most of the bandwidth donations. Due to freeriding the system
performance determined by ﬁle download times is signiﬁcantly degraded. The
Kazaa case study shows the need for a robust mechanism which ensures a
suﬃcient amount of resource donations. In the ideal case, a leak-free resource
economy should be created where each prosumer must donate an amount of
resources equal to its consumption of the collective resource. This problem can
again be seen as a separation of the good from the bad (e.g. freeriders). Kazaa
represents an initial step towards distributed regulation of donated computer
resources, adhering to the second cardinal feature of eﬀective P2P platforms.
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Fig. 4. The contributed content by three types of Suprnova volunteers.
3.4 Regulating bandwidth donations
The freeriding problem encountered in Kazaa is addressed in the design of the
Bittorrent (Cohen 2003) protocol. Bittorrent is a P2P ﬁle download protocol
that provides an incentive to donate bandwidth. Bittorrent’s incentive mecha-
nism is built on a data bartering economy. More precisely, Bittorrent employs
a variant of tit-for-tat mechanism to restrict the content download rate based
on the value of the current contribution. With tit-for-tat users are exchanging
(bartering) local content for the content they wish to obtain from other users.
Bittorrent is only a content download protocol. The content search functional-
ity required for a complete ﬁle sharing solution, has to be provided by means
of external services. A well-known example of such service is the Suprnova site
already described in detail in Section 2. Bittorrent/Suprnova represents a step
forward from a monolithic approach towards a two-layered solution. It allowed
independent evolution of the content transfer protocol and the content browse
& search functionality.
The decentralized Kazaa system quickly suﬀered from spam and pollution.
Suprnova took a step back in the evolution and introduced a group of mir-
rored web servers with a prosumer-based moderation system. To keep the
Suprnova content clean, new submitted content was ﬁrst manually inspected
by moderators, who weeded out fake content, content with low perceptual
quality, and content with incorrect naming. An ordinary user who submits
content is called a moderated submitter. To lower the burden on the modera-
9Fig. 5. Online friendships in the Youtube Internet video community.
tors, a user who frequently injects correct content is promoted to the rank of
unmoderated submitter, and is allowed to directly add content. Unmoderated
submitters can request from the existing moderators a promotion to the mod-
erator status. Figure 4 shows the amount of content published by the three
types of users extracted from the data collected from the Bittorrent/Suprnova
measurements. The horizontal axis presents the users, ranked by the amount
of content they inserted. The vertical axis shows the amount of content they
inserted into Supernova.
The Bittorrent/Suprnova case study shows the diﬃculties of building a scal-
able and spam-free content sharing system. Bittorrent addresses the second
cardinal feature with an upload incentive, but this is not fraud-proof (Piatek
et al. 2007).
3.5 Community interaction and culture
Currently the largest website for publishing and serving video clips, Youtube.
com, represents the ﬁfth point in the evolution of P2P platforms. By all ac-
counts, the Youtube architecture is a step back in the evolution of P2P plat-
forms. All functionality in the Youtube system is provided through a single
website that runs proprietary server software. Furthermore, similarly to Slash-
dot, user contributions have restrictive copyright clauses. The architectural
and copyright limitations of Youtube are compensated by the richness of its
community building functionality.
10With the help of a supercomputer we have crawled over 5+ million webpages
of Youtube, starting in the summer of 2006. This crawl contains detailed
information on numerous users such as their age, country of origin, last online
time, list of their favorite video clips, and their Youtube friends. Figure 5 shows
for 592,900 users of Youtube how many friends they have. The horizontal axis
shows the various users sorted by their number of friends (vertical axis). The
leftmost user shown in this picture has 27,716 “friends”.
The scale of the social network captured in the measurements indicates that
the third and fourth cardinal feature of P2P platforms has clearly advanced in
Youtube to a superior level of sophistication. The simplicity and ease-of-use
of Youtube is one of the driving forces behind its success.
The cost of operating the vast amount of Youtube servers must somehow be
recuperated with targeted advertisements. Google acquired Youtube for $1650
million and the current and future revenues are the focus of much specula-
tion. 3 It remains to be seen if this approach can compete with P2P ﬁle sharing
and can sustain new costly features such as HDTV support.
3.6 Peer production of functionality
The website Facebook.com takes P2P platforms to a new level, and constitutes
the sixth point in the evolution of P2P platforms. Facebook is a website that
enables social networking, special interest communities, and rich multimedia
content. The key element is that Facebook allows a prosumer to improve and
expand the functionality of the platform by creating a “prosumer application”.
All available prosumer applications can be seen through a “browse applica-
tions” menu. A user can install prosumer applications with only a few mouse-
clicks. During the installation procedure a user grants access rights to the
prosumer application. The new application can then access the list of friends,
send messages, and can add itself to the Facebook homepage of the user. On
27 September 2007 there where 4626 of such applications available, with 6049
applications four weeks later. This growth of 355 applications/week indicates
that Facebook has a ﬂourishing community that actively expands it. A key
ﬁnding is the existence of “application spam” on Facebook. For instance, the
application entitled Will you be a miltimillionaire? forces the user to send a
personal message to his/her friends, asking them to also install this applica-
tion. Application spam tries to spread virally across a social network, gain
access to personal information, derive income from (targeted) advertisements,
while oﬀering no real functionality.
3 http://techdirt.com/articles/20070827/121830.shtml
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Fig. 6. Growth of the Burma community on the website Facebook.
The observations indicate that peer production has expanded from origins in
technology-oriented communities (e.g., Slashdot) to other branches of society.
The usage dynamics of P2P platforms in other branches of society is illustrated
by the Burma uprising example. The Facebook community called Support the
Monks’ protest in Burma grew to over 400,000 members in less than 20 days.
Figure 6 shows the speed of this community growth. The horizontal axis shows
the number of days after the community was founded and the vertical axis
shows the community size. The maximum growth occurred on 29 September
2007, when 100,000 new members joined in a single day. It can be concluded
that Facebook represents a step in the evolution of prosumer communities
with impact on society.
3.7 Reputations and decentralized communities
The P2P ﬁle sharing system called Tribler (Pouwelse et al. 2008) can be posi-
tioned as the seventh point in the evolution of P2P platforms. Tribler includes
an explicit reputation system to calculate the “goodness” of others. Repu-
tation systems such as used on the auction website Ebay.com have proven
to be diﬃcult to realize in a P2P setting (Sarkio 2006, Kamvar, Schlosser
and Garcia-Molina 2003). Tribler is the ﬁrst system to deploy a decentralized
reputation system. In its design aspects, Tribler is the complete opposite of
Youtube and Facebook as it lacks any central points, is non-proﬁt, uses Open
Source licenses, and exploits an open model for software development. Central
to Tribler are its social features, its backward compatibility with Bittorrent,
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Fig. 7. Bandwidth contribution graph of encountered peers within Tribler.
and fast keyword search for content.
The Tribler reputation system is founded on the “goodness” of other peers in
terms of reliability, content preference, and bandwidth sharing. The goodness
information of a peer is tied to a non-spoofable public-key identiﬁer and stored
in an embedded database, called the MegaCache. A Tribler peer constantly
explores the P2P network for fresh content and people by making a new con-
nection every few seconds using an epidemic protocol (Pouwelse et al. 2008).
For every encountered peer the similarity of their download taste is determined
using collaborative ﬁltering techniques. Peers with similar taste are “better”
and re-contacted regularly to accelerate content discovery (called semantic
clustering). Every Tribler peer tracks bandwidth contributions of others using
a protocol called BarterCast. 4 to allow the identiﬁcation of freeriders (Adar
and Huberman 2000). Using BarterCast each peer shares with others which
peers have given him upload bandwidth. Peers with no prior knowledge of
each other thus can use the feedback of the peers they know to assess the
trustworthiness of each other.
Figure 7 shows a graphs of such discovered bandwidth contributions as gath-
ered by an Tribler peer, running the unmodiﬁed Tribler software. This data
was accumulated over a six week period after BarterCast was taken into pro-
duction within Tribler. The 690 nodes in this ﬁgure represents peers, the edges
content transfers. The big central node represents the local gathering peer it-
self. The 52 edges originating from the local peer are due to direct bartering
to 52 Tribler peers within Bittorrent swarms. These 52 direct bartering re-
lations are locally observed, all other edges are based on information that is
potentially fraudulent. Together these edges form a web-of-trust that can be
used to estimate the “upload reputation” of any peer using algorithms such
4 http://www.tribler.org/BarterCast
13as PageRank, EigenTrust, and MaxFlow (Sarkio 2006, Kamvar, Schlosser and
Garcia-Molina 2003). Every Tribler peer uses the data from such ﬁgures to
calculate using the MaxFlow algorithm if a peer is possibly freeriding. The
density and the coverage of Figure 7 is an indication of the strength of this
approach.
Although far from perfect, Tribler is to the authors knowledge the most so-
phisticated approach with no central servers in actual use. It is a step forward
compared to the Kazaa approach and the Bittorrent tit-for-tat algorithm, as
both have been shown to be ineﬃcient and insecure (Piatek et al. 2007). It
can be noted that all four cardinal features of P2P platforms are present in
Tribler. Due to the academic purity of the architecture there are no central
points that could limit Tribler scalability.
3.8 Research challenges, trends, and future developments
The evolution of P2P platforms shows that decentralization and trust are
the two prime research challenges. Decentralized P2P platforms consistently
lag behind in sophistication when compared to central web-server-based ap-
proaches. The basic problems of the decentralized approach are converting
unreliable and untrusted donated computer resources into a reliable and trust-
worthy P2P platform and gathering scattered information using software run-
ning locally. The decentralized approach is thus intrinsically more complex.
However, it is still the preferred approach due to the inherent scalability of
decentralized systems. For instance, centralized Wikipedia requires continu-
ous donation rallies to remain functional. 5 It is most likely that a continuous
struggle will remain to retain decentralization while improving sophistication.
The second challenge recurring in all presented case studies is separating the
good from the bad. A distributed reputation system is needed to identify good
prosumers in terms of both content contributions and computer resource do-
nations (Sarkio 2006, Kamvar, Schlosser and Garcia-Molina 2003). This would
provide signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains and allow peer production to ﬂourish fur-
ther. Figure 7 showed the ﬁrst operational distributed reputation system. Ex-
panding and utilising this work will be challenging. A hardened reputation
system would even permit an “Internet currency” and marketplace for com-
puter resources and services 6 and prevent cheating (Piatek et al. 2007).
The two major developments for P2P platforms that will be ready for mass us-
age in 2009-2010will be outlined in the following. The ﬁrst innovation is HDTV
Video on Demand service. This requires improvements to the second cardinal
5 http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Personal_Appeal
6 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6971904.stm
14feature of P2P platforms (regulation mechanism for computer resources) and
further deployment of high speed Internet access such as ADSL2.
The second innovation is anonymous downloading, uploading, and injection
of content using a darknet. A darknet inhibits both Internet censorship and
enforcement of copyright law. The freenetproject.org has in 2000 already
produced a darknet, but it was slow, diﬃcult to use, and oﬀered little con-
tent. Darknets struggle with the second cardinal feature of P2P platforms. Full
anonymity costs both extra bandwidth and is diﬃcult to combine with enforce-
ment of resource contributions. By 2010 darknets should be able to oﬀer the
same performance as traditional P2P software by exploiting social networking.
No eﬀective legal or technological method currently exits to stop darknets,
with the exception of banning general-purpose computing (Zittrain 2007).
Technologies such as secure computing and DRM are convincingly argued to
be unable to stop darknets (Schecter, Greenstadt and Smith 2003).
Opinions on the future of peer production range from “a short lived joke”
to “the amateur collective will thus supplant the professional institution as
the engine of common culture”. 7 The predicted cause of decline is that real
money will start to reward contributors, but this study has found no evidence
to support this view. One likely outcome is that both views are correct. Con-
tributions and resource donations will remain voluntary, but generate a form
of “social credit” that can be passed around and utilized elsewhere. It is very
likely that “social credits” or an “Internet currency” founded on a hardend
reputation system would create an ecosystem in which both prosumers and
businesses can ﬂourish.
Current levels of peer production seem durable and sustainable. For years
there has been continued growth in usage, creative output, sophistication, and
scope. It can be foreseen that peer production will be the dominant content
creation model on the Internet by roughly 2010-2012 if trends continue.
4 Discussion on peer production, net neutrality, and copyright law
The illustrative case studies in the previous section provide insight into the
growth and further disruptive potential of peer production. In the next sec-
tions, a broad view of peer production is taken and linked to historical prece-
dents of price discrimination and 1,000 years of history in property rights.
7 http://www.roughtype.com/archives/2006/07/jason_calacanis.php
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Revenue per MByte of traﬃc for various services.
Revenue per MByte Service
$1000 Wireless texting
$10 Wireless voice
$0.1 Wireline voice
$0.01 Residential Internet
$0.0001 Backbone Internet
4.1 Convergence, net neutrality, and innovation
A single converged infrastructure can now be used to oﬀer services such as TV,
voice, and data. The Net neutrality debate revolves around not favoring one
service or service provider over another and not charging service providers
extra. The rich history of price discrimination which goes back centuries is
often neglected in this debate. Numerous historical precedents of price dis-
crimination are linked by Andrew Odlyzko in (Odlyzko 2008) to the current
net neutrality debate, combined with general observations of the telecommu-
nications industry. This section extends this work and enhances it with peer
production insight.
Key to the existing practice of price discrimination is Table 2 which shows
service revenues. The revenue levels of wireless texting are many orders of
magnitude higher than transporting bulk Internet backbone bits. Keeping this
structure in place is deemed essential by Internet providers. “The key lesson
here is that legacy service providers resist the pressure to become mere bit
pipes” (Crowcroft 2007).
The telecommunications industry main driving forces seems to be duplicating
the unique revenue levels of wireless texting, causing three structural industry
ineﬃciencies. The industry i) fails to focus on its core connectivity business
and is not trying to satisfy proven consumer-demand in a cost-eﬃcient manner;
instead billions are invested and often wasted ii) in developing unproven new
services and iii) technologies to adjust the network to applications.
Evidence for the ﬁrst cause of ineﬃciency is provided by the pioneering French
broadband provider Free.fr. 8 The industry is claiming that net neutrality
would prevent them from building “horrendously” expensive broadband net-
works. However, broadband networks have proven to be inexpensive to build,
which can be called the French lesson. Free.fr is oﬀering unlimited high-speed
Internet access at a fraction of the cost of competitors. Key is that they still
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_(French_ISP)
16obtained the highest earning before interest and taxes in the EU telecom-
munications industry. Free.fr combines unbundled lines, dark ﬁber, vertical
integration, their own DSLAMs, a simple network structure with a disruptive
ﬂat-fee of 30 Euro per month for 28 Mbps broadband, IPTV, and unlimited
international VOIP calls. To reduce cost they build and ﬁne-tune their own
set-top boxes and developed a simple backend billing system. 9
The second cause of telecommunications industry ineﬃciency is the continuous
attempt to compete with end-user service providers using expensive inferior
technology and focus on client/server content delivery while ignoring P2P. The
lack of successful innovations in the area of end-user service development by
the telecommunications industry has been analyzed in detail (Odlyzko 2004).
They failed to predict and exploit innovations such as Youtube and Facebook.
Companies such as Comcast, Cox, and others even block P2P as measured by
project Glasnost. 10 The “excessive usage of broadband” by P2P users is said
to interfere with the service provided to others. This is again an example of
industry failure to see what lies ahead in terms of consumer-demand and re-
quired network capacity. All the top three revenue sources of Table 2 are under
threat of being disrupted due to upcoming innovations in P2P platforms. P2P
platforms oﬀering (wireless) voice and texting are maturing and are feared by
the industry. 11 Future dual-mode GSM-wiﬁ handsets with low-cost municipal
wireless Internet would likely win in a fair competition on merits.
The third cause of ineﬃciency is the industries deep rooted love for historical
circuit switching with quality guarantees and resentment of best-eﬀort packet
delivery from the Internet-era. Experiences over the past decades have indi-
cated that it is more economical to adjust applications to best-eﬀort networks
instead of building smart networks with quality guarantees. Peer production,
P2P technology, and dumb networks form a natural combination oﬀering light-
speed interconnectivity at the center, intelligence at the edges, and scalability
to include all humans. Detailed studies such as (Yuksel et al. 2007) show
that overprovisioning a best-eﬀort network requires extra network bandwidth
when compared to using “ﬂows” (e.g. circuits) with QoS. However, this study
and others often fail to accurately model the economics of saving some band-
width. Overprovisioning may still be economically sound with a consistent
yearly growth rate of Internet traﬃc of 50-60% 12 and inherently more expen-
sive QoS equipment. In short, keeping it dumb is probably smarter.
The success of Free.fr and the public outcry over Comcast P2P blocking shows
that transparency and competition work. It is unfortunate that companies are
9 http://gigaom.com/2007/12/21/xavier-niel-free-fr/
10 http://broadband.mpi-sws.mpg.de/transparency/results/
11 http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/presentations/2007/
kelly-melody-challenges-opportunities-of-VoIP-1-march-07.pdf
12 http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints
17allowed to falsely advertise with “unlimited” broadband and can point to
vague fair use policies to restrict GByte usage and block P2P. To conclude,
creating transparency and real competition in the broadband and telecommu-
nications market as a whole are more likely to improve economic welfare then
an attempt to enforce net neutrality.
4.2 Content industry, copyrights, and compulsory licensing
A transformation in the content industry due to peer production is a very
likely scenario. The content industry is seeing an assault from four directions;
i) eroding of copyright fundamentals, ii) the pirate side of peer production,
iii) changing attitudes towards copyright, and iv) improvements to darknets.
Peer production and detailed historical analysis is undermining the (economic)
justiﬁcation of current copyright legislation. The dominating view is that with-
out statutory protection of cultural products there would be market failure
and under-production. However, peer production is increasingly replacing mar-
kets with commons and oﬀers a wealth of competitive products. A historical
analysis of over 1,000 years land enclosure and commons property reveals
that the right to be included in the beneﬁt stream has recently moved to the
background and hurts innovation (Ford Runge and Defrancesco 2006). An eco-
nomic analysis reveals that EU legislation contains three assumptions which
are not thta valid anymore (Towse 2005). These assumptions are that there
is no clash between content publisher interest and author interest, that only
publishers are capable of entrepreneurship, and that ﬁrms innovate instead of
creators. The value added by publishers is diminishing due to P2P platforms,
as every talented creator can now independently reach an audience of millions
and can pioneer a new business model.
Figure 2 and related work (Byers et al. 2004) show that copyrighted works
are widely available on P2P. This is the key driver for expansion of the US
copyright statute. The US copyright statute is “biased towards the copy-
right industry groups who have largely written them to serve their inter-
ests” (Samuelson 2007). A proposed “copyright czar” at the US White House
level would expand these laws further (Ahrens 2008). These laws are increas-
ingly disconnected from the real world where, for instance, over a third of PC’s
worldwide have a P2P client installed. 13 New legal actions against P2P users
in the US and the recent award of $111 million in damages in the Torrentspy
P2P case indicate the extreme diﬀerent viwepoints from a legal perspective
and a common user perspective. Support for this legislation is eroding. A
study of over 6000 people in Finland showed that the legislative maximum
13 http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071227-one-third-of-pcs-prefer-limewire.
html
18penalty for ﬁle sharing is not matching the participants sense of justice. 14
By 2010 copyright laws will become fully unenforceable due to the continued
mass usage of ﬁle sharing, lack of countermeasures, and availability of darknets
(Section 3.8).
The choice for the future is between protection of failing business models
with stronger laws & enforcement eﬀorts versus legalizing existing practices
and de-criminalization of millions. The experience with P2P shows that a
switch to the latter is needed and new and sustainable Internet-compatible
business models are explored. By creating a new digital superdistribution right
P2P can be legalized for non-proﬁt prosumer usage in combination with a
royalty payment system and compulsory license. Possible compulsory license
approaches are examined in (Gervais 2003). Many people agree that copyright
reforms are needed (Samuelson 2007) and that the rights of the commons “to
be included” should be restored (Ford Runge and Defrancesco 2006).
It is hoped for that peer production will further ﬂourish, laws & business
models adapt, and this wild-west period ends. Unfortunately, one scenario is
that the telecommunication and content industries will join to halt “innova-
tion at the edge” by blocking competing P2P services and litigation, thereby
essentially making them gatekeepers of information by utilizing the same deep-
packet inspection technologies that some goverments use to keep the Internet
“clean”.
5 Conclusion
In this article, the evolution of fully distributed peer production on the Internet
has been outlined and supported by measurement data and empirical analy-
sis. The website Slashdot.org from 1997 represents the starting point of this
evolution. On Slashdot it is observed that it takes less then an hour before
insightfull comments are recognized by the community. With Youtube.com
the concept of user-generated videos became mainstream and the concept of
a friend is taken to an extreme. The top-10 Youtube users with the high-
est amount of friends together boast 72,866 “friends”. Careful study of such
numbers and technology developments leads us to believe that the cardinal
features for eﬀective platforms for peer production (P2P platforms) are: sepa-
ration of good and bad contributions, regulation of computer resources, group
communication, and community building. The measurement studies included
in this paper indicate that peer production is growing in both usage, creative
output, sophistication, and scope. The largest academic measurement to date
on the pirate side of peer production shows that copyrighted works are widely
14 http://inhiit.blogspot.com/2007/09/p2p-survey-results.html
19available for free download and enforcement of copyright is likely to become
impossible by 2010.
The evolution of peer production shows that value creation and innovation is
increasingly moving away from the telecommunication and content industries
towards “the edges”. The current main sources of revenue of both industries
will be diﬃcult to protect and uphold. The past decade of evolution shows the
power of volunteers with self-governance and loose formation of hierarchical
structure based on merit. The next decade is likely to show further growth
as we begin to understand how to organise millions into a fully self-managing
collective.
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